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Oddly Familiar?
Images of the beau sabreur continue to evolve in the 21st 
Century. In an era, when pursuit of — or opposition to — 
ideological goals through violent conflict is increasingly 
regarded with a jaundiced eye by society,1 the world is looking 
for new benign (and malign) points of reference. Enter the 
“James Bond” motif: worldly, humanitarian, concerned with 
the global public good, a seasoned “international,” a natural 
diplomat who eschews violence except as a last resort, coupled 
with a willingness, for part of one’s professional life, to forsake 
conventional lifestyles; possessed of cultural awareness, 
sophistication, diplomacy, and a physical capacity to survive 
in often uncomfortable surroundings — 007 is one of the 
few benign 20th Century paradigms to have endured recent 
cultural, historical and societal shifts.2 Does this sound oddly 
familiar to some of those inhabiting the world of global health? 
And, if so, where might this continuing convergence between 
the pursuit of world peace, international development, 
conflict resolution, and international cooperation — the 
evolution of a history of international health closely 
connected with both colonialism and commerce — ultimately 
lead? Without trivializing or misrepresenting the very serious 
nature of global health work by drawing flippant parallels, 
this commentary examines possible ways in which the remit 
of both the organization and the individual within the métier 
may be expanded to address non-health issues – related to 
international security, diplomacy, and foreign policy – on a 
more formal, structured, and explicit (rather than ad-hoc or 
implicit) basis under the “global health diplomacy” (GHD) 
framework, while also commenting on (1) the limits to such 
integration, and (2) ways in which synergies may be achieved 
successfully.
New Standards of Style
Global health, though encompassing a highly diverse group of 
individuals and organizations with varied motives, specialties, 
and modus operandi, is not, historically, a glamorous 
profession. Often indifferently rewarded, and without those 
formal systems of disciplinary recognition that distinguish 
other walks of life, honours are more often internal and 
nebulous rather than external and quantifiable. In the past, 
society has shown limited interest in recognizing associated 
individual-level altruism and hardships. This, however, may 
be changing. “Generation Z,” we are told, places greater value 
on doing good for humanity than on achievements such as 
wealth accumulation.3 In what Douglas Adams calls the 
“Fundamental Interconnectedness of All Things,”4 disciplinary 
boundaries — which can be both inefficient and artificial — 
in both global health and other professions, are increasingly 
being tested and expanded,5 – akin to the multi-functionality 
and convenience of the modern “smart phone.” Professional 
contributions to resolving the world’s problems, are, in the 
multifarious “smart” era, now hailed as realistic and achievable 
personal goals. Engineers, for example, are increasingly 
becoming environmentalists6; conversely, is it only a matter 
of time before we see Bond fighting the real enemies of the 
21st Century – less Cold War politics and megalomania, 
and greater attention to social and economic inequality, the 
excesses of the military-industrial complex, environmental 
degradation, prejudices, poverty, racism, disease, corruption, 
human rights violations, and improving global health, that 
drive so many of our world’s more fundamental problems? 
Combating such ills, whether natural, cultural, historical or 
man-made, may represent a more compelling rasoin d’etre to 
the next generation than fighting stereotypical and traditional 
global “bads.” The global health remit, under the GHD 
paradigm, therefore becomes increasingly integrated with 
that of the diplomat or the attaché in order to advance the 
global community’s health and non-health goals.
Professional Parallels
Global health workers, who conduct vital and important 
international medical work as well as de facto “barefoot” 
international relations,7 do not sign up to be diplomats — let 
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alone intelligence operatives — and should not be exposed, 
voluntarily or involuntarily, to risks which may affect their 
colleagues as much as themselves.8 However, those doctors, 
nurses, project managers, field staff, epidemiologists, and 
other specialists within the global health community traveling 
to countries such as Afghanistan, Sudan, South Sudan, 
and Iraq do so with the knowledge that they are placing 
themselves in potentially perilous situations — and that, 
directly or indirectly, their endeavours are inexorably tied 
to concerns of conflict resolution, “smart power,” diplomacy, 
foreign policy, and international relations.9 Implicitly, if not 
explicitly, it is not uncommon for global health professionals 
— particularly those politically appointed, or representative 
of national governments — to undertake duties far beyond 
their brief related to foreign policy, and international 
relations,5 even if these pursuits are not always directly related 
to the advancement of health goals, but instead operate in 
parallel with them. Similarly, bilateral aid programs have 
consistently combined political goals with healthcare agendas 
in an implicit manner10; GHD approaches merely make these 
implicit mechanisms explicit, and therefore both clearer, and 
better optimized, by both donors and recipients. The historical 
parallel of global health workers doubling as missionaries, 
or vice versa, is a compelling representation of the medical 
community’s capacity to pursue broader, “downstream” 
goals. In parallel, at the personal level, anecdotal evidence 
suggests that global health work often demands an inherent 
courage and awareness of environmental and situational 
risks – dangers which may not necessarily increase in 
direct proportion to the addition of diplomatic duties and 
responsibilities.11 
The Wrong Way
The assassination of community health workers in Pakistan12 
as an indirect result of associations with clandestine activities 
in the search for Osama Bin Laden, though possibly a one-
off catastrophic event, may have damaged the credibility of 
immunization programs throughout the developing world 
for years to come.13 Such tragedies have, in recent years, 
raised serious questions around the acceptability of implicitly 
combining global health with foreign policy initiatives.14 
This was not an isolated event: Germany’s foreign spy agency 
“routinely camouflages its agents as development aid workers, 
even in war zones,”15 while other countries have allegedly made 
use of aid personnel for intelligence purposes in locations 
such as Cuba.16 Further examples abound: In March 2009, 
Sudan expelled several major foreign aid agencies, including 
Oxfam and Save the Children, from the Darfur region in 
response to accusations by President al-Bashir of foreign aid 
workers being “spies” and “thieves.”17 Global health personnel, 
due to their location and activities, may therefore face ethical 
and moral dilemmas around their implicit role and function, 
including situations such as vaccination or family planning 
programs being used as plots for “western control,”18 or the 
training of health workers manifesting as a threat to the 
military-government apparatus. Even more critically, many 
personnel also remain hopelessly naïve about how both 
donor governance and recipients of aid interpret their work 
in political terms.19 The unplanned, unstructured, and ad-hoc 
combination of global health and foreign policy initiatives 
will, therefore, inevitably lead to  further tragedies and 
failures of the kind described above —with correspondingly 
greater threats to global health workers’ safety and security 
— while the discrediting of associated agencies threatens 
both diplomatic and broader international relations between 
donors and recipients. 
Opportunity Points
Within the global health architecture, opportunity points 
for the involvement of global health in foreign policy can 
only be identified through an understanding of the actors, 
contexts and challenges of both fields. Medicine and health 
are, to a far greater extent than other forms of international 
development, involved in situations of conflict, terrorism, 
warfare, and humanitarian emergency and catastrophe, 
making the integration of diplomacy into related projects and 
interventions of critical importance.20 The advancement of 
foreign policy goals by national governments through health 
and development programs is, thus, a natural evolution of 
this association. Actors such as the Global Fund to Fight 
AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria (GFATM), the President’s 
Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), and the United 
Nations Development Program (UNDP) frequently (though 
on an ad-hoc basis) advance both health and non-health 
agendas in unison, such as the secession of South Sudan 
from the Republic of Sudan,21 challenging extremism in 
Afghanistan,22 or contributing to conflict resolution in 
Iraq.23 Even players such as Medicins sans Frontieres (MSF) 
and the World Health Organization (WHO), despite their 
exclusively apolitical manifestoes, cannot hope to avoid some 
form of non-health influence, partisanship, or even (in the 
case of MSF) potentially offensive elitism.24 At the individual 
level, even non-political global health representatives are 
frequently presented with opportunities to design and deliver 
recommendations and programmatic adaptations that address 
or report on both health and non-health (eg, political, social 
or economic) goals in concert with each other.25 Even more 
fundamentally, such personnel are implicitly responsible for 
North-South relations in their comportment, behaviours 
and personal diplomacy when operating overseas.5 To date, 
however, no standards, trainings, operating procedures, 
evaluation tools or guidelines, though now available,26 have 
been routinely employed this regard.27
The Right Way?
Rather than advocating for greater delineation on this basis, 
fields such as GHD, under certain interpretations,28 attempt to 
resolve these tensions by encouraging, leveraging and making 
explicit such overlaps from the “smart power” perspective, 
employing altruistic operations to pursue broader non-health 
goals including international security.24 GHD can therefore 
be leveraged to pursue global “goods” unrelated to health 
programs – a benign force, as long as it is not manipulated 
into pursuing global “bads” via rapacious foreign policies – 
and, even then, remains a better route than violent conflict. 
Is there, then, a “right” way for global health to interact 
with international politics, intelligence and diplomacy? Or, 
conversely, can non-health professions such as the clandestine 
services also help to advance global health? In spite of the 
threats, dangers, and blanket opposition to such proposals 
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from the medical community,13 if appropriately structured, 
delivered and monitored, there may yet be a place for 
diplomatic, security, and political activities embedded within 
the global health milieu. Those shocked and appalled by the 
scale and scope of civilian casualties in recent conflicts29 
have called for alternatives to engagements such as the Iraq 
War through the implementation of global health programs 
working in collaboration with intelligence services and 
operating under “military umbrellas.”30 Such approaches 
seek to exploit synergies between health and non-health 
organizations such as the advancement of humanitarian 
causes, conflict resolution, and international cooperation, as 
well as via operational overlaps: both groups are embedded, 
often for long periods, in remote and potentially hostile 
cultures; both operate under the aegis of international agencies; 
and both play a (conscious or unconscious) part in broader 
international strategic initiatives which may be unrelated 
to their primary programmatic responsibilities.20 Examples 
such as the highly political nature of the polio immunization 
boycott in Northern Nigeria and related diplomatic efforts to 
overcome challenges to uptake, are representative of potential 
future successes of disciplinary integration based on GHD 
approaches.31 However, successful collaborations are equally 
dependent on adherence to a set of standards and operating 
principles that recognize and respect both mutual and distinct 
goals, operating procedures, and standards of conduct 
between health and non-health organizations.32 
Building Mutually Acceptable  and Appropriate Collaborations
Such approaches represent the antithesis of contemporary 
thought in this regard, and will inevitably provoke 
controversy. Innovative and interdisciplinary combinations, 
most frequently designed to involve health in broader global 
agendas but also, conversely, to integrate and pursue foreign 
policy concerns via international development, if ever to occur 
successfully, must be carefully and meticulously planned – 
not least to protect the health, safety, prestige and operational 
independence of the global health community. If this is 
possible, on the basis, perhaps, of adherence to and application 
of appropriate criteria for the “diplomatic” and “foreign policy” 
sensitization of global health interventions,11 opportunities 
for mutually acceptable associations may exist. These might 
include, for example: (1) Leveraging the location and presence 
of international health programs in unstable regions for 
international security and conflict resolution purposes; (2) 
enhancing and engaging with information gathered through 
monitoring and evaluation systems to better understand local 
communities, cultures, and preferences; (3) exploiting the 
extensive collaborations that global health efforts develop 
with community, district, regional, and international bodies; 
and (4) eraming such associations as an explicit quid pro quo 
with recipient countries, whereby vital intelligence efforts 
related to national and international security are, formally or 
informally, exchanged for, or combined with, the provision of 
altruistic development programs. 
Uneasy Allies
As health and politics become increasingly and inexorably 
intertwined, the risk of “cross-contamination” across 
previously-distinct professional and disciplinary challenges 
increases exponentially; associations between clandestine 
organizations such as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 
world politics, and global health initiatives have never before 
been so much in the public eye.33 Similarly, the invovement of 
military organizations as potential actors in in global health 
operations — such as under Operation United Assistance in 
response to the Ebola outbreak33 — are the subject of intense 
contemporary media interest, scrutiny, and even alarm. 
Such reflection is both welcome and necessary, and has both 
the safely of global health workers and the advancement 
of international cooperation and diplomacy as it’s goal. 
Nonetheless, with the decreased stature, cost-effectiveness, 
international social and cultural acceptability, and even 
relevance of “hard power” operations in the 21st Century, 
opportunities for such collaborations in the interests, not 
just of global health, but also of broader international 
security, are both of increasing importance and increasingly 
unavoidable. In the context of contemporary crises such 
as Syria and the Islamic State, both strategic and altruistic 
initiatives have either failed, or faced unacceptable security 
challenges — at both the individual and organizational levels 
— when operating independently of each other. Structured 
liaisons and collaborations may be the only alternative 
left. Success, in turn, relies on intelligence, military, global 
health, and development organizations working together in 
unprecedented ways, as characterized by the recent creation 
of the United States’ Office of Global Health Diplomacy 
(OGHD) embedded within increasingly political divisions 
of the State Department.34 The involvement, in such cases, of 
essentially political and foreign policy departments into the 
very mechanics of global health program design and delivery 
should be welcomed and endorsed by the global health 
community – not just for the added global health funding this 
dual agenda may generate, but because of the essential and 
urgent need to integrate diplomatic principles and practices 
into a profession that has, for too long, been dominated by the 
narrow (and often culturally, politically and diplomatically 
insensitive) nature of interventions designed exclusively by 
the medical and economic professions.35 Those involved will 
likely resent and resist such encroachments of their purview 
– but both shaking and stirring such boundaries will, in the 
21st Century, continue to be an essential part of global health’s 
evolution. 
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